The EU has in recent years adopted the International Labour Organisation's Decent Work Agenda in its external trade and development policy. It is portrayed as a way to mitigate any negative impacts on labour. However, African trade unions have campaigned against the EU's Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). It is argued that their stance highlights the limitations of incorporating the Decent Work Agenda into trade agreements, which instead are seen as central to the process of entrenching economic liberalisation. As a result, the article considers the prospects for transnational labour solidarity to resist EPAs.
Introduction
During the 1990s the EU and the US led an unsuccessful attempt to try and include labour standards into the multilateral rules on trade regulated by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 1 This was a campaign which was supported by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). It was argued that nation-states were increasingly powerless to protect labour rights and therefore 'the leadership of the ICFTU felt that...the only strategy left for labour was to try and make the existing international institutions as least harmful to labour as possible'. 2 However, a number of trade union movements in the Global South were Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the Caribbean (CARIFORUM) was agreed in 2008. 3 The specific focus of this article is the recently signed EPA between the EU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which is the first comprehensive EPA signed with a group of African states.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. In the next section I introduce the key aspects of the Decent Work Agenda. Here I demonstrate how it has become an increasingly central feature of the current global development orthodoxy, encapsulated most obviously in the recently agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). I then trace how this has been reflected in the EU's trade and development policy. Here I argue that the inclusion of 'decent work' in recent trade agreements provides a rhetorical justification for an approach that actually reflects the interests of European capital. The focus then turns to the EPA negotiations between the EU and SADC. Here I outline how the labour movement, although it remains weak in many states across the region, has to varying degrees of intensity, pursued a strategy of resistance in response to the negotiation of an EPA. I also show how this critical stance taken by African trade unions in relation to EPAs has also been articulated at both the continental and regional levels. I then consider the prospects for transnational labour solidarity in response to the EU's trade agenda and the SADC EPA in particular. I argue here that these prospects have been compromised in the past because the European labour movement has been more convinced by the significance of the inclusion of labour standards in trade agreements. Only in the last few years has it demonstrated both a more critical stance on EPAs and more explicit solidarity with the labour movement in Africa. The article then concludes by considering the options available to trade unions in how they respond to the inclusion of the Decent Work Agenda in PTAs.
'Decent Work' and the global development orthodoxy
Decent work has featured increasingly prominently in the emerging orthodoxy on global development. The idea of 'decent work' was set out as the ILO's primary goal in 1999 by the then Director-General, Juan Somavía. 4 It was central to a reorientation of the ILO's main focus, whereby they would seek to work more actively in tandem with other institutions of global governance. The theme of 'decent work' became the central concept for this new approach and was organised around four key objectives. These were the promotion of core labour standards at work, a focus on decent employment and income, enhancing social protection, and a commitment to social dialogue. 5 The aim was to make 'decent work' a universal principle, which at the same time would be sufficiently flexible for it to be interpreted in relation to local context. 6 As a result, the ILO's definition of 'decent work' has remained rather imprecise and vague. It was reaffirmed as being at the core of the ILO's focus in a key declaration in 2008. 7 Within the ILO's tripartite structure, employers have continued to be effective in preventing a more concrete definition or set of indicators from being adopted. 8 Despite these limitations, 'decent work' as an idea has become embedded within the new 'common sense' on global development.
In contrast to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agreed in 2000, 'decent work' does feature in the SDGs. 9 The SDGs could be argued to be relatively more transformative than the MDGs, given that they are a global agenda, rather than essentially a justification for North-South aid programmes. 10 Goal 8 of the SDGs is to 'promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all'. 11 It is acknowledged in the SDGs that employment on its own is not a guarantee for poverty reduction. As Teichman argues, however, the SDGs themselves do not 'suggest what policy measures would mitigate precarious, low-paid employment for women, youth, or other members of society'. 12 Moreover, in Africa the creation of meaningful jobs remains a real challenge despite the higher growth rates achieved in many parts of the continent since the early 2000s. 13 Since the introduction of the Decent Work Agenda the EU has enhanced its co-operation with the ILO. In fact, it has been convincingly argued that 'by aligning itself with the ILO's broader decent work discourse and programmes, the European Commission acquired a distinctive role in global social governance'. 14 In general, EU development policy has closely followed the emerging Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) since the early 2000s. The PWC seeks to overcome some of the limitations of the neoliberal development model that dominated policymaking during the 1980s. In particular, it acknowledges that neoliberalism had failed to create a sufficient number of productive employment opportunities in many countries in the Global South. The response within the PWC has been to focus on improving education so that there is an increased supply of more skilled labour in developing countries. 15 At the same time, as this article demonstrates, the PWC still retains a belief that trade liberalisation remains a key driver of development. What remains in question, therefore, is where the demand for this more highly skilled labour will come from. The ILO's Decent Work Agenda is portrayed as the missing link. It becomes the key to ensuring that these qualitative improvements in the supply of labour will result in better quality employment opportunities. This is certainly the view of Guy Ryder, the current Director-General of the ILO, who in a recent statement argued that 'decent work' is the key to making progress on reducing both inequality and poverty. 16 Similarly, the United Nations Development
Programme has argued recently that the ILO's Decent Work Agenda 'and the human development framework are mutually reinforcing'. 17 In the next section, I outline in more detail how the EU has sought to combine the ILO's Decent Work Agenda with its negotiation of EPAs with ACP states.
Understanding 'decent work' in the EU's trade and development policy On globalisation, I think we face a two-fold task: first, of harnessing globalisation, of using this force to produce growth and jobs, and better regulation in the name of justice. And secondly, to ensure that we also ensure that development and more specifically the interests of developing countries are fully considered. Article 50 includes the commitment of all signatories to recognise the ILO's core labour standards and not to use them as a disguised form of trade protectionism. 22 However, in reality this did not lead to significant outcomes in practice. In particular, the implementation of core labour standards by ACP states has not featured in political dialogue prompted by the Cotonou Agreement. 23 What we have seen in more recent years, however, is an apparent increase in the commitment to the Decent Work Agenda in trade agreements concluded by the EU. The EPA signed with CARIFORUM includes a chapter on 'social aspects' and the more recent agreement concluded with the SADC grouping includes a 'trade and sustainable development' chapter. In both of these cases clear references are made to a commitment to the ILO's Decent Work Agenda. 24 The EU also highlight the role that Aid for Trade (AfT)
can play in ensuring that trade agreements support the goals of the Decent Work Agenda.
Alongside these policy developments in the EU's external relations, a new way of conceptualising the EU as a global actor, 'normative power Europe' (NPE), entered the academic debate. 25 It was suggested that we can identify five central norms inherent to the European project: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. 26 The NPE approach led to an increased focus on the importance of ideas in conceptualising the EU's external relations; but at the same time, in doing so, it failed to provide an adequate appreciation of Europe's material interests, which feature quite explicitly in the case of trade negotiations. Moreover, it puts too much faith in the rhetorical construction of the claims made by the EU itself as to its normative agenda. As Sjursen suggests, there is a danger that NPE analysis 'leaves researchers vulnerable to the charge of being unable to distinguish between their own sympathy for the European project and their academic role as critical analysts'. 27 Rather, the negotiation of reciprocal trade agreements with ACP states, demonstrates the EU's overarching ideational commitment to neoliberalism, albeit in the form of the PWC. This ideational position means that in reality 'the negotiation of EPAs brings the EU's material self-interest and the framing of its normative goals closer together.' 28 Hence, what we have witnessed in recent decades is the emergence of what should be more accurately understood as 'corporate Europe', rather than 'social', or 'normative power'
Europe. In terms of this being reflected in the EU's external relations, a clear turning point came with the publication by the European Commission of its 'Global Europe' strategy in 2006. 29 As Bieler makes clear, this new trade policy was primarily driven by a desire to boost the competitiveness of the EU economy, but at the same time it was also justified by the Commission in terms of the developmental benefits it would confer on its trade partners. 30 Given the neoliberal ideology at the heart of EU policymaking, trade is seen as a positivesum game where all participants benefit. As a result, European policymakers genuinely believe that they can 'enhance Europe's profits but also achieve ethical objectives associated with livelihood creation, employment, and trickle-down poverty elimination for poorer citizens in former colonies'. 31 Hence, in the case of the negotiation of EPAs with ACP states, the EU's ambitious strategy to include behind-the-border issues, rather than simply the liberalisation of trade in goods, represented 'a concerted attempt to secure much 'deeper' roots for the neoliberal development model'. 32 Although it has faced significant resistance to these more comprehensive EPAs, the Commission's current trade strategy makes it clear that by including rendez-vous clauses in the most recently concluded EPAs, they remain firmly committed to the eventual inclusion of services and investment. 34 In so doing, the EU hopes to assuage any critics who may highlight potential downsides to this approach. As a way of justifying its development policy this is not a new political strategy. As Langan reminds us, the EU has a long history of including specific measures within its relationship with ACP states to legitimate the developmental claims of its policies. 35 In essence then, there are significant problems with the concurrent rise of an agenda that is increasingly driven by the needs of European capital, and the commitment to ensuring the ILO's Decent Work Agenda is also advanced. The main aim of this article, however, is not to focus on demonstrating the gap between rhetorical EU policy claims and the reality of the impact of EPAs in relation to the Decent Work Agenda. Prior research has already done an excellent job in this regard. For example, Orbie notes how the peculiar institutional set-up of the EU, whereby the Commission has competency for trade policymaking, means that it becomes more likely that any commitment to social norms will be secondary to material interests. 36 Meanwhile, Langan in a more forceful and compelling critique, focuses on two specific economic sectors (poultry production and cut-flowers) to highlight the gap between the EU's discourse on 'decent work' and the actual outcomes of its trade and development policies to Africa. 37 Instead, I want to explore these tensions in relation to the response of trade unions to the EPA negotiations between the EU and SADC. In doing so I will assess the resultant challenges posed to transnational solidarity between the labour movement in Europe is often referred to as SADC-Minus. 40 As noted in the previous section, 'decent work' features in a number of the articles within the text of this EPA. In particular, Article 8 refers to 'decent work for all as a key element of sustainable development for all countries and as a priority objective of international cooperation'. 41 Meanwhile, Article 11 suggests that the signatories to the agreement may cooperate on 'the trade aspects of labour or environmental policies in international fora, such as the ILO Decent Work Agenda and MEAs'. 42 Hence, we see the inclusion in the final agreement of the discourse aligned to the normative developmental agenda identified in the previous section. At the signing ceremony in Kasane, Botswana, the EU Trade Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, reinforced this message in a speech where she argued that:
It's a pragmatic deal based on a realistic collective assessment of everyone's relative strengths. As a result it will allow all six countries to shelter products and sectors from competition where needed in some cases forever, in other cases over long timelines.
That makes it strongly pro-development. As do the provisions on workers' rights and protecting the environment. The EPA favours sustainable development -not growth at all costs! 43 Similarly, during the ratification process of the SADC EPA in the European Parliament in September 2016, the MEP acting as chief rapporteur, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, suggested that 'the language on human rights and sustainable development is one of the strongest that you will find in any EU agreement'. . 51 The case of South Africa is a rather unique one within the SADC region, as they had already signed a Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU in 1999. 52 Hence, the government's aim was to resist any further opening up to European capital, whilst seeking improved access to the European market.
COSATU's opposition to the final EPA was less apparent than it had been during the earlier phase of the negotiations. Their main focus was on the use of export taxes, which are more limited under the terms of the SADC EPA. Export taxes are a way to increase the value of commodity exports and COSATU argued that they 'are necessary in order to ensure that minerals are processed and jobs are created in SA'. 53 The Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU) joined COSATU in contributing to a statement by a network of African trade unions on EPAs, which argued that the 'rapid loss of government revenue will paralyse our governments' abilities to invest in education, health and decent jobs'. 54 In responding to a Presidential State of the Nation address, BFTU were also critical of the long-term consequences of signing an EPA with the EU, suggesting that the government failed 'to place the link between diversification, economic strategy and trade policy'. 55 Similar concerns were expressed by the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) who, like COSATU in South Africa, supported their own government in refusing to sign the iEPA. NUNW's then Secretary General, Evilastus Kaaronda, argued 'that the proposed tariff reductions will cut very heavily into our labour intensive sectors leaving the majority of the already languishing Namibians further trapped in poverty'. 56 At the regional level, the impact of trade union resistance to EPAs has been significantly undermined by organisational limitations. The main platform for putting forward a regional voice, SATUCC, includes all the major national labour federations in the region. Ever since 1995 when the decision was taken within SADC to form a new sector on 'Employment and Labour', SATUCC has been formally recognised as the regional voice of labour. 57 However, SATUCC's influence is reflective of the relative strength and organisational capacity of many of the national trade union federations outside of South Africa. 58 As with other attempts at coordination of civil society actors in the region, SATUCC is limited by the fact that 'regional agendas are not evident to the national members and their respective constituencies'. should be stopped'. 61 In sum, the labour movement within the SADC region has been clear in its opposition to the negotiation of EPAs. This has been most effectively articulated within the national context, in particular by COSATU in South Africa, rather than through SATUCC at the regional level.
They remain unconvinced by the claims made by the European Commission that EPAs will ensure the advancement of the Decent Work Agenda across the region. Given that the growth of PTAs has become central to the process of entrenching economic liberalisation, it is important that the international labour movement works together to resist their negotiation. In the next section, I consider the extent to which trade unions within Europe have supported the stance taken by their colleagues in the SADC region.
The SADC EPA negotiations, transnational labour solidarity and the prospects for 'decent work'
As the previous section has highlighted, African trade unions have been consistent in their resistance to the negotiation of the SADC EPA with the EU. As I argued earlier the Decent Work Agenda fits within the broader PWC global development orthodoxy. As such, it provides a framework of rights for workers that, whilst important, are often difficult to enforce. However, proponents of the PWC, such as the EU, also remain committed to comprehensive trade agreements based on reciprocal liberalisation. These seek to ensure that 'peripheral capitalist spaces become locked into new relationships of unequal exchange'. 62 The negative consequences of these agreements are often more significant for workers in the Global South and this has meant they have been more explicit in their opposition to the negotiation of free trade agreements in the first place. This contrasts with trade unions in the Global North who have tended to focus on ensuring that the agreements contain clauses that can ameliorate their overall impact on labour. As a result, this structural context makes solidarity between Northern and Southern trade unions difficult, but at the same time it is important to ensure that labour retains sufficient agency in the analysis. 63 trade agenda. 67 In doing so, they are reflecting the material interests of their members ahead of the broader goals of international solidarity.
In response to the particularly contentious EPA negotiations, both ETUC and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) jointly took the position that development should be put at the heart of the trade negotiations, and in particular they called for 'strong, effective and operational social and labour chapters'. 68 Thus, the European trade union movement took a reformist stance in arguing that the EU's normative claims to the developmental potential of EPAs were not without foundation. The key argument being made was that labour rights must be effectively enshrined with the final EPA agreements. 2014 led to a re-think in the European labour movement. 70 Even trade unions that were previously supportive of free trade have adopted a more critical stance, such as IG Metall, which represents German metalworkers in a range of sectors including the car industry. 71 In the specific case of the SADC EPA, the TUC published a letter urging MEPs not to ratify the agreement, because it 'will restrict the policy space of governments...cause a significant loss of revenue from tariffs and undermine fundamental labour rights'. 72 The letter also made a direct reference of support for ITUC-Africa, who in a recent statement provided a damning assessment of EPAs arguing that overall they 'will only make it harder for Africa to achieve the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals'. 73 The recent change in the stance taken by European trade unions is also related to the realisation that there are significant limitations to the strength of the sustainable development chapters within EPAs. In its submission to the European Commission's public consultation ...the EPA does not have a strong Sustainable Development chapter that would enable us to put forward social, labour and environmental concerns stemming from the implementation of the Agreement. In particular, the chapter does not explicitly establish monitoring bodies with the participation of trade unions, and satisfactory procedures for the enforcement of the sustainable development provisions are lacking. 78 In sum, the main argument being developed here is that despite some limited recent progress in the strength of transnational labour solidarity in response to EPA negotiations by the European trade union movement, the reality is that the global development orthodoxy outlined earlier remains pervasive. This orthodoxy suggests that the inclusion of the Decent Work Agenda in trade agreements will ensure that workers across the globe will see improvements in the four central objectives identified by the ILO. This article outlines why trade unions should resist, and not legitimate EPAs with ACP states. Otherwise they will be sanctioning a set of agreements that will ultimately ensure the 'lock-in' of a liberalisation agenda and domestic regulatory environments across Africa that serve the interests of transnational capital rather than labour.
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Conclusions
In conclusion, this article has highlighted some of the limitations of the Decent Work Agenda given the structural context of continuing attempts to deepen the process of trade liberalisation. Trade unions have a choice to make in the strategies they pursue in this regard.
They can act as legitimators of trade policy (as has often been the case with respect to the trade union movement in the EU) or they can adopt a counter-hegemonic role by resisting EPAs and advancing a more transformative agenda. 
